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[L. A. No. 19456. In Bank. Apr. 2, 1946.J 
CONSOLIDATED VULTEE AIRCRAFT COlWORATION 
(a Corporation), Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNITED 
AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL 
IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF Al\IERICA LOCAL 904, 
Defendant and AppelJant. 
[lJ Appeal-Moot Questions.-A court will not continue with the 
I"e\·iew of an arbitration award in proceedings for its confirma-
f iOIl or vacation if the award does not affect the present rela-
tiolls of the parties, and an appeal from a judgment confirming 
such award will be dismissed where an amendment of a con-
tract to which the award relates ha!' become inoperative with 
the termination of the contract. 
[2] Arbitra.tion-Award-Necessity for Confirmation by Court.-
An employer is under no enforceable duty to agree to the 
amendment of a labor contract to which an arbitration award 
relates where the order of the superior court purporting to 
confirm the award is in effect an order vacating the award. 
[8] Appeal-Moot Questions.-An appeal is prevented from be-
coming moot only if the rights of the parties are directly af-
fected by its determination, and the possibility that a labor 
union, appealing from a judgment purporting to confirm an 
arbitration award, would greatly improve its bargaining posi-
tion should there be a determination that the award was valid, 
[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. 749; 1 Cal.Jur.l0-Yr. Supp. 465. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Appeal and Error, § 18; [2] Ar-
bitration, § 5a. 
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dol's nol COI\.>,tilnt.p sueh nn,illllll('(lint(' interest in the litigation 
liS wOlllil 1"!''1llil"(' a jl1(1.:!'m<'nt nn t.he merits ~I here a new 
IIgreelll('nt has RllJler~(l('(l the agrl'l'ment that was to be 
IlIlH'Ilflrcl lln(ll'l" th!' award. 
Al'I'EAl~8 from jUdglllClltR of the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County corifirmill~ an award of arbitrators, 
and from an order to correct and amrlld a jl:dgmcnt. llelJl'Y 
M. Willis, Judge. Appeals dismissed . .. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, J. Stuart Keary and Ira C. 
Powers for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Katz, Gallagher & Margolis, Milton S. Tyre and Ben 
Margolis for Defendant and Appellant. 
TRAYNOR, J .-On June 1, 1942, United Automobile Air-
craft and Agricultural Implement 'Vorkers of America Local 
904, hereinafter referred to as the union, and Consolidated 
Vultee Aircraft Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the 
company, entered into a collective bargaining agreement, 
which was to remain in effect "until June 1, 1943, or until 
ninety (90) days after the present war in which this country 
is engaged is terminated, whichever is longer, and shall there-
after automatically renew itself in its entirety from year to 
year for a period of one (1) year." On February 19, 1945, 
the parties entered into a new collective bargaining agreement 
superseding the former one. They also entered into a sep-
arate agreement providing that the agreement of February 
19. 1945, shall not prejudice the claims of either party on 
the present appeal and shall not affect the parties' conten-
tions "concerning the advisability ot including therein ap-
propriate provisions on maintenance of membership and 
check-off." 
The present litigation arose under the first agreement, 
which provided that "if mutual consent for amending Agree-
ment is not given, the desirability of amendment may be re-
ferred to the grievance procedure." Grievances were to be sub-
mitted to the plant grievance committee of the union and the 
company's labor relations committee. If the company and 
union representatives could not agree, they could invoke the 
arbitration procedure provided for in the agreement. The 
union initiated grievance proceedings to obtain an amendment 
) 
) 
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adding provisions 1'0" '{lUllltcll:lIlCe of membership and check-
off of union dues ~1(1 initiation fees. Ilu\'illg failed in the 
g-I'ic\"unce p"oecllure tosecurc the company's COlJScnt to sl1ell 
all amendmcnt, the unioll ill\"ol;cd the arbitration procedul'e 
to hU\'e the following all)CJHl!~cllt added to the contra('t: "In 
order to secure the increased production whieh will "esult 
frolll gl'eatel' harlllollY be~!cen workers and employers and 
in the interest of increased cooperation between union and 
manugement, which cannot exist without a sta bJe and respon-
sible union, the parties hereto agree as follows: All em-
plo~'ees who, 15 days after the date of this amendment to the 
contract are members of the union in good standing in ac-
cOl'dance with the constitution and bylaws of the union and 
those employees who may thereafter become members shall, 
during the life of the agreement as a condition of employ-
ment, remain members of the Union in good standing. The 
Company for said employees shall deduct from the first pay 
of each month the union dues for the preceding month of 
one dollar ($1.00) and promptly remit the same to the sec-
retary-treasurer of the Local Union. The initiation fee of 
the Union of three dollars ($3.00) shall be deducted b~' the. 
Company and remit.ted to the secretary-treasurer of the Local 
Union in the same manner as dues collection. The Union 
shall promptly furnish to the Company a notarized list of 
members in good standing 15 da~·s after the date of the 
amendment to the contract. If any employee named on that 
list asserts that he withdrew from membership' in the Union 
prior to that date and any dispute arises the assertion or 
dispute shall be adjudicated in aecordance with the arbitra-
tion procedure of this agreement and the decision of the 
arbiter shall be final and binding upon the Union, the Em-
ployer and the employees." 
The permanent arbitrator elected by the parties under the 
contract made an award determining that the parties should 
add the proposed amencl.ment to their contract. The com-
pan~' filed a motion in the superior court under sections 1288, 
1200 of the Code of Civil Procedure to vacate the award on 
the ground that the arbitrator impaired the exclusive right 
retained by the company to hire and discharge its employees 
nnd exceeded his jurisdiction in violation of the provision 
in the agreement that the arbitrator "shall not have juris-
diction to arbitrate provisions of a new agreement or to arbi· 
) 
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trate away, in whore or in part, any provisions of this Agree-
ment." The union filed a cross-motion for confirmation of 
the award under sections 1287 and 129] of the Code of' Civil 
Procedure. The court made 'an order confirming the award. 
but a month later corrected its order nu.nc pro tunc, stating 
"that the foregoing amendment does not and shall not be 
construed to impose any obligation upon the employer to 
discharge any employee.JDr failure to maintain in good stand-
ing his membership in the union according to the Constitution 
and By-laws of the Union and does not impair t.he exclusi\'e 
right t.o hire and discharge emR,loyees given by Article I, 
Section 6, of the contract to which the amendment relates." 
The order of the court must be read with this correction. By 
correcting its order. the court determined that it had juris-
diction to make the correction. The corrected order became 
the court's disposition of the case and was subject to the 
right of the parties to appeal. The decision of the court was 
corrected, nominally a confirmation of the award, was actu-
ally a cancellation thereof, for the award made maintenance 
of membership in the union "a condition of employment" for 
all employees who were or became union members after the 
expiration of the 15 days' escape period specified in the 
award. The order must be read as also denying confirmation 
to the check-off proYision, for it appears from the arbitration 
proceedings that the check-off of initiat.ion fees and union 
dues was applied for and allowed only as an incident to the 
maintenance of membership provision in order to prevent 
forfeiture of employment b~' nonpayment of union fees and 
dues. Both parties appeal. 
[1] It is contended that the appeals have become moot 
because the new agreement has superseded the agreement that 
was to be amended under the award. An amendment that 
would become inoperative with the termination of a contract 
obviously cannot take effect after such termination. Since 
the amendment to which the award relates has become obso-
lete, a confirmation of the award would be meaningless. A 
court will not continue with the review of an arbitration 
award in proceedings for its confirmation or vacation, if the 
award does not affect the present relations of the parties, just 
as it will not continue with the review of a decision by a 
court if t1l(' \lr('i~jf)n r:mllot 1)(' (,lJfOI'C{,(l. .As the rnited Stat{'~ 
Supremc l\nut t.lcclurct.l in 111ills Y. Green. 159 U.S. 651, GjJ 
-) 
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f16 S.Ct. 132, 40 L.J~cl. ~!-!3 J : "the duty of this court, as of 
every other judicial tribunal, ~ to decide actual controversies 
by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to 
give opinions upon Il!oor, quest ions or abstract propositions, 
or to declare principles 'or rules of law .. which cannot affect 
the matter in issue in~he cas(' br.fore it. It necessarily follows 
that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower 
court, and without any fault of the defendant, an eyent oc-
curs which renders it impossible fol' thi~ court, if it should 
decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effectual 
relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judg-
ment, but will dismiss the appeal." (See California Pacific 
etc. Co. v. California Mining & D. Syndicate, 17 Cal.App.2d 
353, 355 [61 P.2d 1181]; General Petroleum Corp. of Cali-
fornia v. Beilby, 213 Cal. 601 [2 P.2d 797]; Armstrong v. 
Sacramento Valley Realty Co., 179 Cal. 648, 651 [178 P. 
516]; Estate of McSwain, 176 Cal. 287, 288 [168 P. 117]; 
Hindman v. Owl Drug Co., 4 Cal.2d 451, 456 [50 P.2d 438]; 
Fletcher v. Dexter, 60 Cal.App.2d 275 [140 P.2d 697]; see 
2 Cal.Jur. 749; 1 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. 465.) 
[2] The union contends, however, that it would be en-
titled to recover damages from the company if the award 
were confirmed. In this regard the union asserts that sub-
sequent to the award and before the new contract was made. 
thousands of union members failed to pay their dues and 
thereby became delinquent in their membership; that such 
delinquencies would not have occurred had the maintenance 
of membership clause been in effect; and that therefore th-: 
company, by opposing the award in the confirmation pro-
ceedings, was responsible for the union's loss of union dues. 
The union, however, could claim damages only if the com-
pany was guilty of a breach of contract. There was no such 
breach, for the company was under no duty to agree to the 
amendment of the contract in the absence of a confirmation 
of the award. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code 
of Civil Procedure an award becomes enforceable only if it 
is confirmed by the superior court (§ 1287). Upon such con-
firmation it is made enforceable b~' the entry of a judgment 
(§ 1291) .. which "has the same force and effect, in all re-
spects, as, and is subject to all provisions of law relating to, 
a judgment in an action; and .. , may be enforced, as if it 
has been rendered in an action in the court in which it is 
/ 
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entered." (§ 1292.) III th(> pr('sent case, ~ince th(> compa.ny 
had made a motion to '::1catc th(> award, no order of confirma-
tion and no ju(l~n'\"'ent fOJ" the enforcement of the award 
could be entered until the motion to vacat(' the award wa8 
disposed of. (§§ 1287.: ]288.) Since the ordel that the trial 
court entered bef~e the n~w contract was made was in 
effect an order vacating the award, the company was under 
no enforceable duty to agree to the amendment. 
The duty that would have been imposed upon the com-
pany by the award had it lYccome enforceable did not exist 
independently of the award. The award was not made to 
determine existing contract rights; its purpose was to create 
contract rights that had not previously existed and therefore 
could not be enforced or violated hefore the award became en-
forceable. There is a clear distinction between such an award 
and an award determining that existing contract rights have 
been violated. "Arbitration is frequentl~' used as a method 
in the settlement of labor disputes. Occasionally it is used 
to interpret the terms of an existing contract. but more often 
it is utilized for the purpose of making a contract, or creating 
or perfecting the relation of employer and employee between 
the respective parties. Arbitration8 concerning wage disputes 
and union recognition are of this type. They are not judicial 
in their nature but are rather a part of the collective bar-
gaining process. These arbitrations are like commercial ar-
bitrations in name alone." (6 Williston, Contracts, rev. ed., 
§ 1930. ) The present award i8 also clearly distinguishable 
from an award prescribing an increase in wages as of a speci-
fied date. If such an award is confirmed after the date speci-
fied for the commencement of the wage increase, it follows 
from the terms of the award that back-pay can be collected 
thereunder after its confirmation. Such back-pay represents, 
not the payment of damage8 for \'iolation of a contract, but 
the performance of an obligation created by the award. 
[3] The union also contends that a determination that 
the award was valid and should have been confirmed would 
greatly improve its bargaining position. In this respect it 
refers to the provision in the present collective bargaining 
agreement that the agreement will not affect the contentions 
of the parties as to the adyisahility of including therein pro-
visions on maintenance of membership and check-off. It con-
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ship and check-off clauses in the recently expircd contl'nf't, 
would provide a greater arguil1~ point for the lmion in de-
manding the same in its J:>resent HJ·Hi-l!"l4G rOlltl'!l('t and in 
all future contracts .... It is well known alllon~ tliose who 
participate actively in ~]Jeetiye bar!!"aining ncgotiatiollS thnt 
the presence or absence of a partirular clanse in a re('enlly 
expired contract oft~ i'l the most influential fact or in dct Cl"-
mining the presence or absence M the !-lame provision in the 
next following contract." If present rights of the union 01' 
the company depended on the"validity of the award, the ap-
peals would not be moot even though the amendment could 
not be put into effect. Thus, if the present agl'eement pro-
vided that maintenance of membership and cbeck-off provi-
sions should be inserted therein if the award validly provided 
such amendment of the former agreement, the determination 
of its validity would involve present contract rights of the 
parties and would therefore not be an abstract decision. The 
union does not claim, however, that its rights under the new 
contract depend upon the determination of the present liti-
gation. ,It contends merely that its chances to improve its 
present contract would be increased if it were determined 
that the award should have been confirmed. An appeal is 
prevented from becoming moot only if the rights of the parties 
are directly affected by its determination. Their interest must 
be "immediate ..• and not a remote consequence of the 
judgment." (Hamilton Trust Co. v. Cornucopia Mines Co., 
223 F. 494, 499 [139 C.C.A. 42]; California Pac. etc. Co. v. 
California Mining &7 D. Syndicate, supra, 17 CaLApp.2d 353, 
354.) The possibility that the union might be able to utilize 
a favorable decision on its present appeal for the creation 
of future contract rights does not constitute such an imme-
diate interest in the present litigation as is required for pro-
ceeding therewith to a judgment on the merits. 
The questions presented on these appeals having become 
moot, the appeals are dismissed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
